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CORPORATE PROXIES: II*
Leonard H. Axe t
The first installment of this article discussed the historical development of the right and power to vote by proxy, and examined the cases
dealing with the regulation by by-law of the right to vote by proxy,
who may act as proxy holders, ahd the form of the proxy. Emphasis
was placed upon the practical aspects of the execution of proxies and
the duties of inspectors of elections. The present installment will take
up the persons entitled to appoint proxy holders, the right to examine
proxies, the scope of authority conferred and exercise of power, circumstances under which a stockholder is bound by his proxy holder's unauthorized acts, and revocation and termination of proxies.

VII
PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPOINT PROXY HOLDERS

Earlier ·sections have discussed the general right to vote by proxy.
However, questions may arise whether particular classes of stockholders
such as infants and married women have the legal power to appoint
proxy holders. Also, statutes frequently make specific provisions regarding the voting of stock by personal representatives and fiduciaries, by
pledgors or pledgees, and by transferors or transferees. In such instances the further question arises whether the person entitled to vote
may vote by proxy as well as in person.

A. Infants
Upon the question whether an infant has the power to give a proxy
to another to vote his stock, no very definite statement can be made,
except the dictum in State ex rel. Voight v. Voight 188 to the effect that
an infant lacks the legal capacity to execute a valid proxy. But in view
of the trend in the more recent and apparently better considered

* The first installment of this article appeared in the August issue, 41 MrcH.
L. REv. 38 (1942).
•
A.B., Baker University; LL.B., University of Ka-nsas; S.J.D., University of
Michigan. Professor of Business Law, School of Business, University of Kansas.-Ed.
138
2 Ohio App. 145 at 146 (1913). In this case the court, after holding that
another election was necessary, said "for the guidance of the parties in the future we
deem it our duty to say that an infant has no right to give a proxy to another to
vote his or he1 stock in a corporation."

t
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cases,189 namely, that an infant may act through an agent in ordinary
transactions as fully as if personally present, the dictum in the Voight
case does not seem sound. Also, since an infant is attempting to exercise
a property power, rather than a right arising out of contract, there
should be no objection to an infant appointing a proxy holder to exercise this property power for him. California has enunciated such a
policy by an express statutory provision.140

B. Married Women

In the few cases that have considered the question of the power

'

of a married woman to vote her corporate stock by proxy, there has
been unanimity of opinion that she may appoint an agent and give him
authority to vote her stock by proxy.141 The power of a married woman
to vote her stock by proxy has received statutory sanction in four
states,142 and is permitted by statutory implication in at least another.148
C. Personal Representatives and Fiduciaries
'

As a general rule, executors, administrators, guardians and others·
in a fiduciary capacity have the power to vote in the name of the
stockholder stock standing on the books of the corporation at the time
of his death.144 And they are entitled to vote it by proxy.u 5 Likewise,
189
Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924); Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. 697 (1897); 31 A. L. R. 10q1 (1924).
14
°Cal. .Civ. Code (1941), § 320b (3), providing "Shares standing in the name
of a minor may be voted and all rights incident thereto may be exercised by his
guardian, in person or by proxy, or in the absence of such representation by his guardian
by such minor in person or by proxy."
141
Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 220, 100 P. (2d) 765
(1940) (married woman voting stock in maiden name); Hoene v. Pollak, 118 Ala.
617, 24 So. 349 (1897); State ex rel. Rankin v. Leete, 16 Nev. 242 (1881); Florida
Clay Co. v. Vause, 57 Fla. 407, 49 So. 35 (1909); Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90
Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925); Capitol Hill Undertaking Co. v. Render, 149 Okla.
132, 299 P. 854 (1931). These cases did not involve niarried women's general
disability.
142
Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-126; Mont. Rev. Code (1935), § 5955;
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929), § 1683; Okla. Stat. (1941), tit. 18, § 52.
148
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 328c ("she may enjoy and exercise all the rights of
a shareholder").
144
Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69, 175 So. 753 (1937);
Billings v. Marshall Furnace <;o., 210 Mich. I, 177 N. W. 222 (1920); Benkard v.
Leonard, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N. Y. S. 497 (1931).
146
State ex rel. Voight v. Voight, 2 Ohio App. 145 (1913); Glahe v. Arnett, 38
Idaho 736, 225 P. 796 (1924) (dictum); Schmidt v. Mitchell, 101 Ky. 570, 41
S. W. 929 (1897); Noremac, Inc. v. Centre Hill Court, 164 Va. 151, 178 S. E. 877
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a trustee may vote in person or by proxy when stock is owned by the
trust estate. 146 Power to vote corporate stock is now often conferred by
statute on executors, administrators, guardians and others acting in a
representative or fiduciary capacity. Some of these statutes expressly
confer the power to vote by proxy,147 while in those which do not 148
this power would no doubt be implied.
(1935) (dictum); Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165
A. 136 (1933); Gans v. Delaware Terminal Corp., (Del. Ch. 1938) 2 A. (2d) 154;
Burke v. Universal Granite Quarries Co., 180 Wis. 520, 193 N. W. 517 (1923); In
re Election of Directors of Cape May & Delaware Bay Nav. Co., 5 I N. J. L. 78,
16 A. 191 (1888); Elevator Supplies Co. v. Wylde, 106 N. J. Eq. 163, 150 A. 347
(1930); La.fferty's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 430, 26 A. 388 (1893).
As a general rule a receiver has the power to vote stock placed in his care by the
court. Strang v. Edson, (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) 198 F. 813. Also, where a receiver has
been appointed and the property assigned includes stock of a corporation, the court
may compel the giving of a proxy to the receiver enabling him to vote the stock at
meetings of the stockholders of the corporation. At'kinson v. Foster, 27 111. App. 63
(1887), affd. 134 111. 472, 25 N. E. 528 (1890). A bankrupt has the right to vote
stock in his name on the books of a corporation, even though his property vests in the
trustee under the Bankruptcy Act. State ex rel. White v. Ferris, 42 Conn. 560
(1875); Kresel v. Goldberg, I I I Conn. 475, 150 A. 693 (1930).
146
3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 551, p. 1738 (1935), giving list of
states in which the power to vote corporate stock is expressly conferred upon trustees
by statute.
147
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 320b (1); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 41, § 30;
Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935), § 6739; Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133(4); 111.
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 193 5), § I 57.30 ("but no guardian, conservator, or trustee
shall be entitled, as such fiduciary, to vote shares held by him without a transfer of
such shares into his own name"); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939), § 1112 (V); Md.
Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 26; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25
(VI); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-51; 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938),
§ 2852-506; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington,.Supp. 1940), § 3803-28 (5).
148
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 3405 (persons holding stock in -a fiduciary
capacity have same voting rights as any other holder of shares); Del. Rev. Code
( l 93 5), c. 6 5, § I 8 {persons holding stock in a fiduciary capacity have power to vote
the shares so held); D. C. Code (1940), § 29-221 (executors, administrators,
guardians or trustees shall represent stock in their hands); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933), § 25-207(e) (3) (fiduciaries may vote shares in such manner as instrument
appointing fiduciary directs); Iowa Code (1939), § 8391 (fiduciary "may vote the
same as a stockholder"); Ky. Stat. (Carroll, Baldwin Rev. 1936), § 552 (persons
holding stock in a fiduciary capacity entitled to vote the shares); Mich. Gen. Corp.
Act (1931), § 33, Stat. Ann. (1937), § 21.33; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939), § 5001
(executors, administrators, guardians or trustees may vote as stockholders); Mont.
Rev. Code (1935), § 5947; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-7 (every person holding
stock in any representative or fiduciary capacity may vote as a stockholder); N. M.
Stat. Ann. (1929), § 32-143 (executors, administrators, guardians or trustees may
vote as stockholders); N. C. Code (Michie, 1935), § I 174 (executors, administrators,
guardians or trustees may vote as stockholders, unless instrument creating trust otherwise directs; life tenant may vote in person or by proxy); N. D. Laws (1913), §
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It is generally agreed that an executor may give a proxy where it
contains an express direction as to the manner in which the vote shall
be cast.149 While the restriction on the power of a :fiduciary to execute
a proxy has not been considered in many proxy cases, there is authority
to be found in the cited cases that a proxy given by an executor which
delegates to the· proxy holder the authority to vote as he sees :fit is
void. 150 This same rule would undoubtedly apply to administrators
and others acting in a :fiduciary capacity.151 The courts apparently proceed on the theory that the discretion lodged in the :fiduciary cannot
be delegated to another, but must be exercised by the :fiduciary alone.152
Although the courts say that a gel?-eral proxy given by a :fiduciary is
"void,"- they p~obably mean that such a proxy is "voidable." 153 While
4516; Phil. Is. Acts (1906), No. 1459,- § 27, p. 150 ·(executors, administrators,
guardians and other persons in position of trust may vote as stockholders); Porto Rico
Laws (1911), No. 30, § 22, p. 98; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 116, § 24; S. D.
Code (1939), § 11.0112; Wis. Stat. (1941), § 182.15 (executors, administrators,
guardians, assignees for creditors, receivers or trustees may vote as stockholders). These
statutes probably do not abrogate the rule against fiduciaries delegating a discretionary
function.
Many instruments of trust, particularly collateral trust indentures, as well as
many inter vivos trusts, provide that the settlor shall be entitled to a proxy from the
trustee. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Pennsylvania Company for Ins. on Lives & Granting
Annuities, 205 Pa. St. 219, 54 A. 783 (1903). Also many testamentary trusts expressly giv~ such power.
149
State ex rel. Voight v. Voight, 2 Ohio App. 145 (1913); Glahe v. Arnett,
38 Idaho 736, 225 P. 796 (1924) (dictum); Noremac, Inc. v. Centre Hill Court,
164 Va. 151, 178 S. E. 877 (1935) (dictum).
15 Cases cited in note 149, supra. The right to confer general or discretionary
power upon such proxy holders is granted by statute in at least two states. Minn. Stat.
(Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25 (VI); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-51.
151
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPQRATIONs, perm. ed., § 2054 (1931).
152
State ex rel. Voight v. Voight, 2 Ohio App. 145 at 147 (1913), stating "The
discretion lodged in an executor must be exercised by him alone and can not be
delegated." Discretionary proxies are no longer being solicited following publication
of the rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission for the solicitation of authorizations.
·
'
153 The word "void" is often used when the courts mean "voidable." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 227 (1936); 3 id., § 746. A voidable contract is one
"where one or more.. parties thereto have_ the power, by a manifestation of election to
do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract; or by ratification of the
contract to extinguish the power of avoidance." CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § I 3
(1932). To sustain the proposition that such a proxy is void and all action taken
pursuant to the proxy likewise void, leads to the conclusion that any action so taken
at corporate meetings can be upset at any later date. Such a conclusion, however, is
not consistent with the stand the courts have tak!!n on related proxy problems. For
example, the courts are very reluctant to interfere in the internal management of
corporations, and are particularly reluctant to interfere with the election of directors
or the conduct of corporate meetings. Furthermore, courts have held that unless timely
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the delegation by a fiduciary constitutes an unauthorized act and a
breach of trust, it does not necessarily follow that the action· taken
pursuant to the unauthorized delegation of power is of no force and
effect whatsoever. After the breach of trust has occurred, it would
seem clear that the beneficiary may ratify the act and thereby prevent
himself from claiming thereafter that the vote cast at the corporate
election by proxy was illegal. 1 fi 4 Furthermore, a stockholder objecting
to a proxy on the ground that it is a complete delegation of the
fiduciary's authority is confronted with the difficulty of proving that there was a complete delegation of discretion and that no secret instructions accompanied the grant of authority. 1 fi 5 Certainly in a case where
a fiduciary gives a general proxy accompanied by secret oral instructions
as to the manner in which to exercise the proxy, there would be no
breach of trust, nor would the proxy seem to be invalid.
Since the appointment of a person to act as proxy holder for the
shareholder is an agency relationship and inasmuch as a dead man
cannot be represented by an agent, a testamentary direction that a
named person should vote the decedent's stock is not a valid proxy.uo
Where there are two or more fiduciaries and they cannot agree among
themselves as to the manner of voting the stock, the stock cannot be
voted.m However, statutes in several states have changed the rule
that all of several cofiduciaries must agree to be permitted to vote the
stock. These statutes permit the majority of the fiduciaries present at
corporate meetings to vote the stock where two or more persons are
designated as proxies, or if only one is present, then that one is given
the power to decide the vote, unless the instrument appointing the
objection to proxies is made the action taken pursuant to such proxies will not be
upset. In re United Towns Building & Loan Assn., 79 N. J. L. 31, 74 A. 310 (1909);
Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917). In addition,
there seems to be no rule of public policy involved which would make such proxies
absolutely void.
1 fi 4 "After a breach of trust has occurred, a beneficiary may expressly or impliedly
express satisfaction with the act and thereby prevent himself from claiming thereafter
that it was illegal." 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 942 (1935). Also, as
pointed out by this same authority, the same doctrine runs through the law of
principal and agent, master and servant, and corporations.
m State ex rel. Lally v. Cadigan, 103 Wash. 254, 174 P. 965 (1918) (dictum
that stockholder may accompany his proxy with secret instructions as• to the manner
in which the vote should be cast upon particular questions).
1 6
fi Tunis v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R.R., 149 Pa. St. 70, 24 A. 88 (1892).
u 7 Highland v. Empire Nat. Bank of Clarksburg, l 14 W. Va. 473, 172 S. E.
544 (1933).
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fiduciaries otherwise provides.158 And some statutes provide further
that, where the fiduciaries are equally divided, any court of competent
jurisdiction, upon petition, may appoint an additional person to act
with the fiduciaries in determining the vote.159
Where a testator appoints two or more executors, they must
ordinarily act jointly in voting stock belonging to the estate. And if
they cannot agree as to the manner in which the stock is to be voted,
the right to vote is nullified.160 Thus, in Tunis v. H estonville, M. & F.
Pass. R. R.,1 61 a case in which a testator left corporate stock to three
executors in trust, but provided by a codicil that two of them should
give his son, the third executor, a proxy or authority to vote the stock
as the son wished, the court held that a master· appointed to supervise
the election was justified in rejecting the ballots altogether inasmuch
· as the executors disagreed as to the manner in which the stock should
be voted. Later, however, in a case involving the same will, it was
held that the other executors must execute the proxy as required by
the will. 162
_
A further situation likely to arise involves the validity of a proxy
signed by one of several cofiduciaries, in the absence of authority from
the other fiduciaries so to do. If one of several fiduciaries signs the
proxy without the authority of his cofiduciaries, the presumption of
validity ought to apply if the proxy were uncontested. And this would
seem especially sound where the proxy does not call for the proxy
holder to exercise any discretion in casting a vote at corporate elections,
but merely confers upon him the authority to perform the purely
158
Ark. Stat. (Page, 1937), § 2189; Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 320c; Fla. Comp.
Gen. Laws (1927), § 6553; Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1941), § 22-1863; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935), § 6739; Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133 (4); La. Gen. Stat.
(Dart, 1939), § 1II2(V); Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 26; Minn. Stat.
(Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25(V); Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929), § 1628;
58 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940), "Stock Corporations Law," § 48; Ohio
Gen. Code (Page, ~938), § 8623-53; 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 2852-507;
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938), § 3740; Va. Code (Michie, 1938), § 3800; Wash.
Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28 (5).
159
Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133 (4); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939), §
III2 (V); Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 26; 58 N. Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney, 1940), "Stock Corporations Law," § 48; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington,
Supp. 1940), § 3803-28 (5).
160
Townsend v. Winburn, 107 Misc. 443, 177 N. Y. S. 757 (1919) (dictum);
Highland v. Empire Nat. Bank of Clarksburg, II4 W. Va. 473, 172 S. E. 544 (1933).
161
149 Pa. St. 70, 24 A. 88 (1892).
162
Lafferty's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. 215 (1886), affd. by equally divided court in
154 Pa. St. 430, 26 A. 388 (1893).
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ministerial function of voting the stock as directed.163 • Of course, if
contested, the proxy holder would have to produce proof that the
fiduciary signing the proxy had the necessary power to sign.
A voting trustee, unless specifically authorized to do so by the
voting trust agreement or by statute, may not entrust the performance
of his duties to another.164 However, the right of a voting trustee to
delegate to a proxy holder the power to vote stock held by virtue of a
voting trust agreement has received statutory sanction in a number of
jurisdictions.165
D. Pledgor-Pledgee
Where stock stands on the books' of the company in the name of
the pledgor, and in the absence of any agreement to the contrary
between the pledgee and the pledgor, the latter has the right to vote
the stock either in person or by proxy. 166 But the right to vote is
vested in the pledgee where the stock has been transferred to the
name of the pledgee on the books of the corporation.167 Likewise, in
163

State ex rel. Voight v. Voight, 2 Ohio App. 145 (1913).
ln re Green Bus Lines, 166 Misc. 800, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 556 (1937);
Chandler v. !3ellanca Aircraft Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 57, 162 A. 63 (1932), noted 46
HARV. L. REv. 333 (1932); 81 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 339 (1933); 18 CoRN. L. Q.
274 (1933).
165
Colo. Stat. Ami. (1935), c. 41, § 45; Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 65, § 18;
Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-134 (7); Kan. Gen. Corp. Code (1939), § 67, Gen.
Stat. {Supp. 1941), § 17-3308; La. Gen. Stat. {Dart, 1939), § 1113; Mich. Gen.
Corp. Act (.1931), § 34, as amended, Stat. Ann. (1937), § 21.34; Minn. Stat.
(Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-26; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-10; 15 Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 511; Phil. Is. Acts (1928), No. 3518, § 15, p. 433;
Wash. Rev. Stat. {Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-29; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1937), § 3085.
166
Wolf v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Southern Pines, (C.C.A. 4th, 1937)
92 F. (2d) 233; Finefrock v. Kenova Mine Car Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1927) 22 F. {2d)
627; Cohen v. Big Stone Gap Iron Co., III Va. 468, 69 S. E. 359 (1910); Haskell
v. Read, 68 Neb. 107, 93 N. W. 997, 96 N. W. 1007 (1903); In re Barker, 6
Wend. (N. Y.) 509 {1831); Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. {N. Y.) 402 (1827);
Granite Brick Co. v. Titus, (C.C.A. 4th, 1915) 226 F. 557; State ex rel. Rankin
v. Leete, 16 Nev. 242 {1881); Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35
P. 1045, 37 P. 207 (1894).
167
Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 152 Pa. St. 217, 25 A. 535 {1893); Haynes v.
Griffith, 16 Idaho 280, IOI P. 728 (1909).
In Oregon it has been held that the pledger is entitled to vote corporate stock
even though it is recorded on the books of the corporation in the name of the pledgee.
State v. Smith, 15 Ore. 98, 14 P. 814, 15 P. 137, 386 (1888) (dissenting opinion).
People ex rel. Allen v. Hill, I 6 Cal. I I 3 ( I 860), is substantially to the same effect.
It is generally agreed, however, that the better rule is opposed to the Oregon doctrine.
Commonwealth v. Dalzell, supra; In re Argus Printing Co., I N. D. 434, 48 N. W.
347 (1891).
164
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the absence of statutory _provision to the contrary, the pledgee is end'tled
to vote the shares when ·the books of the corporation show that he is
the holder ot the title as collateral security merely, if the stock books
are conclusive evidence of the right to vote.168 Also, where the stock
books are merely prima facie evidence of who are entitled to vote, the
pledgee in whose name the stock stands may execute a valid proxy,
unless the pledgee's right is contested by the pledgor.169
The parties to the pledge agreement may agree between themselves
as to who should vote the stock.110 And where in the pledge agreement
the pledgor reserves the right to vote the stock, the stock being recorded
in the name of the pledgee on the books of the corporation, the pledgor
may by a bill in equity compel the pledgee to give the former a proxy
to vote the stock.171 A small number of states have statutes which give
the pledgor the right to vote the stock regardless of record title, and
in these states, even though the pledgor has not reserved the power
so to do, he may nevertheless vote the stock at all meetings of the
stockholders.112 But even in the absence of statute, a pledgor may, in
168

Some courts take the view that the stock books of the corporation are conclusive evidence of the right to vote. Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371,
55 N. W. 547 (1893); ~x parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402 (1827); Atterbury
v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 743); Lawrence
v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 220, 100 P. (2d) 765 (1940), superseding
(Cal. App. 1939) 92 P. (2d) 917.
_169 Where the stock books are prima facie evidence of title and the pledgee appears
on the books as holder of the legal title, the corporation officers will not look behind
the books to ascertain the actual owner of the shares. Hoppin v. Buffum, 9 R. I. 513
(1870); Haskell v. Read, 68 Neb. 107, 93 N.' W. 997, 96 N. W. 1007 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 152 Pa. St. 217, 25 A. 535 (1893); Canadian Improvement Co. v. Lea, 74 N. J. Eq. 234, 69 A. 455 (1908). In Commonwealth v. Dalzell,
supra, I 52 Pa. at 221, the court said, "In the absence of any agreement between the
parties on this point, it would seem that the right to vote should follpw the legal title.
If that was allowed to remain in the pledgor, his right to vote could not be questioned,
while, on the other hand, if the legal title was transferred to the pledgee, his prima
facie right would be equally clear."
17
°Commonwealth v. Dalzell, 152 Pa. St. 217, 25 A. 535 (1893).
171 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities,
205 Pa. St. 219, 54 A. 783 (1903).
172 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 53-210 ("The absolute right to vote and represent any stock in a corporation transferred to or held by any- person as security for
money advanced thereon or for any other indebtedness, at any meeting held by the
corporation, shall belong to the person who deposits or transfers such stock as security
for such indebtedness, and any vote cast by any person holding stock as such security,
shall be void"); Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 56, § 27 ("After the owner of stock in a
corporation has transferred, mortgaged or in any way pledged the same to another
for security merely, and it so appears in such transfer, mortgage or pledge, and on the
books of the corporation, such owner continues to have the right to vote upon such
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a proper case, by a bill in equity compel the pledgee to give him a
proxy to vote the stock.173 However, in order to invoke the aid of
equity to compel the pledgee to give him a proxy the pledgor must
show that the interests of the company have been or will be impaired,
or that the value of the stock has been or will be impaired, and that
the aid of the court is necessary to protect the interests of the pledgor.174
In addition to the states which provide by statute that the pledgor
of stock shall be entitled to vote regardless of record title, many other.
jurisdictions have statutes relating to the circumstances under which
the pledgor or the pledgee may vote.175 The voting right under the
stock at all meetings of the stockholders until his right of redemption ceases") ; Mo.
Rev. Stat. (1939), § 5001 (persons who have pledged their stock shall be entitled to
vote upon such stock).
One writer has stated that Colorado provides by statute that the pledgor of
stock is entitled to vote regardless of the record title, citing Colo. Stat. Ann. ( 193 5),
c. 41, § 30. 9 RocKY MT. L. REv. 92 (1936). The Colorado statute reads as follows:
"and persons whose stock is pledged, shall be entitled to vote thereon so long as said
stock remains in his name on the books of the corporation, unless in the transfer by the
pledgor he shall have expressly empowered the pledgee to vote thereon, in which
case only the pledgee or his proxy may represent said stock and vote thereon, if
written notice, signed by the pledgor and the pledgee, setting forth such delegation,·
shall have been served upon the corporation at least ten days prior to the date on
which such stock is to be voted by the pledgee." The author of the above note
probably had an earlier Colorado statute in mind, "Every executor, administrator,
conservator, guardian or trustee shall represent the stock in his hands at all meetings
of any such corporations, and may vote accordingly as a stockholder, and every person
who shall pledge his stock may nevertheless represent the same at all meetings and
vote accordingly." Colo. Gen. Laws (1877), § 211, p. 150, Gen. Stat. (1883), §
257, p. 185. Under this statute the owner and pledgor of corporate stock was entitled
to represent and vote upon the stock regardless of record title. Miller v. Murray, 17
Colo. 408, 30 P. 46 (1892).
178
Vowell v. Thompson, 3 Cranch 428, 28 F. Cas. 1308, No. 17,023 (1829);
In re Argus Printing Co., l N. D. 434, 48 N. W. 347 (1891); Hoppin v. Buffum,
9 R. I. 513 (1870); Benkard v. Leonard, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N. Y. S. 497
(1931); Canadian Improvement Co. v. Lea, 74 N. J. Eq. 234, 69 A. 455 (1908).
174
McHenry v. Jewett, 90 N. Y. 58 (1882). Injunctive relief has been granted
to pledgor when to permit pledgee to vote would destroy the very purpose of the
pledge. Burke v. Universal Granite Quarries Co., 180 Wis. 520, 193 N. W. g17
(1923).
175
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 320b (1); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 41, § 30;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 3405; Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 65, § 18; D. C.
Code (1940), § 29-222; Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133(4); Ill. Ann. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1935), § 157.30; Iowa Code (1939), § 8391; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp.
1941), § 17-3306; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, Baldwin Rev. 1936), § 552; La. Gen. Stat.
{Dart, 1939), § 1n2 (IV); Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 26 (2);
Mich. Gen. Corp. Act (1931), § 33, Stat. Ann. (1937), § 21.33; Minn. Stat. {Mason,
Supp. 1940), § 7492-25 {VIII); N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-n N. M. Stat.
Ann. (1929), § 32-143; 58 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940), "Stock Cor-
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Delaware statute,176 is in the pledgor where thereis no express authorization to the pledgee to vote the stock registered in his name.111 But the
New Jersey statute.,118 which states
". . . every person who shall pledge his stock as collateral
security may, nevertheless, represent the same at all such meetings, and may vote theredn as a stockholder, unless in the transfer
to the pledgee on the books of the corporation he shall have expressJy empowered the pledgee to vote thereon, in which case only
the pledgee or his proxy may represent said stock and vote
thereon,"
has been interpreted "to apply to cases in which the stock was transferred to one as 'pledgee,' or, at least, to cases in which the transfer
gave notice to the corporation that the transferee was pledgee." 179 In
the same case, Canadian Improvement Company v. Lea,180 the court
. went on to say that the corporation
"· .. was not intended by this statute to have the burden cast
upon it of determining the question, as between the parties, as to
whether the transfer was in pledge or not. The duty of the corporation -is to recogniz,e the registered holder shown on its transfer books."
Due to the routine of buying and selling shares of stock on margin,181
the stockbroker is worthy of special mention. Usually, when stock is
purchased on margin the broker advances the funds needed to finance
the purchasing of the sto~k. In so doing, the broker becomes a creditor
of the customer, with the rights of a pledgee. And by the majority
rule,182 the title vests in the margin holder just as though he had
porations Law,"§ 47; N. C. Code (Michie, 1935), § II74; Porto Rico Laws (1911),
No. 30, § 22, p. 98; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), § 24; Va. Code (Michie, 1938), §
3801; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp; 1940), § 3803-28 (5).
176
Del. Rev. C9de (1935), c. 65, § 18.
177
Italic Petroleum Corp. of America v. Producers' Oil Corp. of America, 20
Del. Ch. 283, 174 A~ 276 (1934).
178
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-7, first enacted in 1896.
179
Canadian Improvement Co. v. Lea, 74 N. J. Eq. 234 at 250, 69 A. 455

(1908).

Id., 74 N. J. Eq. 234 at 250.
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 271 (1935).
182
Tuckerman v. Mearns, (App. D. C. 1919) 262 F. 607; Little v. McClain,
134 App. Div. 197, II8 N. Y. S. 916 (1909). A few jurisdictions follow the rule
that the title to shares purchased _on margin vests in the broker. Bentinck v. London
Joint Stock Bank, [ 1893] 2 Ch. 120; Dennett v. Wilmerding, 291 Mass. 264, 196
N. E. 860 (1935); Farnham, "Effect of Pledgee's Breach of Duty on Existence of
the Debt," 35 MICH. L. REv. 253 at 267 (1936).
180
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ordered his broker to purchase the shares outright.188 By the terms of
the usual customer's agreement, the broker is authorized to repledge
or loan the securities purchased, and title remains in the "Street Name"
until the customer tenders the balance due on the purchase price and
demands delivery. As a matter of general law, the customer impliedly
authorizes the broker to vote the stock when he permits it to stand in
the broker's name on the books of the corporation.184 Thus, in the case
of In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New J ersey,1 85 which was a proceeding
under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act for the reorganization of
Pressed Steel Car Company, a New Jersey corporation, the debtor
company proposed a plan of reorganization, which was submitted to
its stockholders and creditors for acceptance. A special master was appointed by the -court to audit the acceptance of the debtor's plan and
certain revocations of acceptances and report to the court thereon. The
special master reported that the plan had been accepted. Exceptions
were filed by the preferred stockholders' committee to the report of
the special master, among which was the following: "(c) Stock registered in the names of brokerage houses was voted by such brokerage
houses without proof being furnished that such brokerage houses had
been authorized by their customers to vote such stock." The court held
such an objection had no merit, and stated,

"· •• An equitable owner of shares who permits them to stand
in his broker's name impliedly authorizes the broker to vote
them; any other rule would lead to hopeless confusion. The
broker, as registered owner, is entitled to vote the stock registered
in his name.... The fact that brokers may be obliged, under the
rules of the New York Stock Exchange or under any other requirement of law or regulation, to obtain the consent of their customers
183

"As a rule they [speculators] are indifferent as to whether or not the shares
involved are registered in their names, or indeed, as to whether or not such shares
even exist. Thus the real ownership of the shares held on margin may be said to
remain in abeyance during the interval between their sale by one investor and their
purchase by a second. However, due to the fact that legally trained minds cannot
conceive of property existing without its ownership being vested in somebody, and
because the rules of the New York Stock Exchange forbid transactions in which actual
delivery and receipt of shares is not contemplated, a fiction is employed to the effect
that the title vests in the margin holder and the true nature of the speculating function
is disguised in the routine of a bona fide purchase and sale." TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 282 (1935).
184
General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 214,
127 A. 529 (1925); In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey, (D. C. Pa. 1936) 16
F. Supp. 3 29.
'
185
(D. C. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 329. Quotations from p. 336.
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before voting the stock does not alter the rule of law in this respect; the presumption being that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, of which there was none in this case, consent had been
obtained."
In the absence _of rules or regulations by the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,186 there are no restrictions imposed by the Exchange Act upon
the execution of proxies by brokers in whose name the customer's stock
is held of record.187 The only restrictions upon the execution of proxies
by brokers in whose name the customer's stock is held of record is to
186

48 Stat. L. 88 (1934), 15 U. S. C. (1940), § 78a. Section 14(b) (7811]
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or
any broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any
such member to give a proxy, consent, or authorization in respect of any security
registered on a national securities exchange and carried for the account of a customer
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." There
are no rules or regulations under the Securifres Exchange Act of 1934 with reference to
§ 14(b) of such act. See SEC's General Counsel's opinion in Securities and Exchange
Act Release 605, April 17, 1936.
187
The writer has been informed that prior to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and before the enactment of the rules of the New York Stock Exchange's Board
of Governors with respect to proxies, brokers often failed to respond when solicited
for proxies to represent stock owned by a customer but registered in the broker's
name or its nominee. One reason for this "do nothing policy" on the part of the
bro~ers was the many requests that were made for proxies from conflicting interests,
and the brokers' dtsire not to offend any customers or potential customers. As a matter
of business practice, the company seeking the proxies would follow up its origii:ial
solicitation by a call upon the broker in person or by telephone, inform the broker no
contest was expected, number of shares of record, number of proxies received and the
number the company would like the broker to send. Usually, this request was fulfilled.
Most of these problems, however, have been eliminated since the enactment
of the Securities Exchange Act of I 934 and the adoption of rules with respect to
proxies by the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges of like nature. Since
these new rules have become effective, brokers have followed. two different methods or
plans for securing the customer's permission to sign a proxy to vote stock owned by the
customer but registered in the name of the broker or its nominee. The early procedure,
which may be termed "Plan A," was for the broker to sign a proxy which was limited
to the number of shares held by the customer and mail the signed proxy to the
customer with instructions to remail if the proxy met with the customer's approval.
Under "Plan B," the broker mails his customer a sample proxy, and if the sample
meets with the customer's approval he instructs his broker to sign' a proxy that corresponds to the sample. Some brokers insist on using ','Plan A" since they feel that it
reduces the amount of mechanical work involved in such solicitations; under "Plan B"
the broker has to keep the data for three years inasmuch as it is considered a part of
the permanent record.
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be found in the rules of the particular exchange of which the broker is
a member. 188
E. Transferor-Transferee
The general rule, in the absence of statutory provisions or an agreement between the parties to the contrary, is that a person to whom
shares of stock have been transferred is entitled to vote such stock even
though the transfer to his name has not been made on the books of the
corporation.189 And in the words of the court in the case of In re Canal
Construction Company,1 90 "As bl!tween a transferor who has parted
with all beneficial interest in stock and his transferee, the broad equities
are all in favor of the latter in the matter of its voting."
In the absence of a provision in the statute, articles of incorporation,
or the by-laws of the company, the right to vote shares of stock is determined as of the time of the meeting of the shareholders. Hence, the
person in whom the legal title is vested at such time is entitled to vote.
But many states have adopted statutes which either require corporations
to keep books of records or of registration, or empower the corporations
to enact by-laws requiring such books to be maintained. And registration of transfers on the books may be a condition upon the right to vote,
while in others the books are conclusive or the only evidence of stock
ownership.191 Also, many states by statute authorize corporations to
enact by-laws restricting the vote of transferees to those whose trans188
The New York Stock Exchange in 1927, with a view to checking certain
abuses arising from the practice of members of the exchange giving proxies upon stock
which might stand in their names but which was not in their possession and in which
neither they nor their customers had any interest, adopted rules tending to restrict
the right of members to give proxies upon such stock. These rules tended to make it
difficult, in many instances, for the management to secure sufficient proxies to constitute a quorum for a stockholders' meeting. Consequently, there was a tendency
to reduce the percentage of stock required for a quorum, which narrowed the basis
of control of corporations. The New York Stock Exchange, therefore, in December
of 1937, found it expedient to liberalize its rules.
189
People ex rel. Pickering v. Devin, 17 Ill. 84 ( I 8 55) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Morris v. Stevens, 168 Pa. St. 582, 32 A. I I I (1895). National bank stock presumably
belongs to the person in whose name shares stand on books of the bank. Schlener v. Davis,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 371. The owner of stock that has been enjoined
cannot vote such stock in person or by proxy. Beale v. Columbia Securities Co., 256
Mass. 326, 52 N. E. 703 (1926); Clarke v. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of
Georgia, (C. C. Ga. 1892) 50 F. 338.
190
(Del. Ch. 1936) 182 A. 545 at 548. Note 34 MICH. L. REv. 1039 (1936).
191
For a classification of the different types of provisions relating to registration
and the right to vote stock, see 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed.,
§ 2033 (1931).
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fers become of record or were registered a certain number of days before the meeting.102
A difficult problem arises when a registered owner, who has parted
with stock, attempts to vote it by proxy. In considering the problem of
the right to vote transferred shares by proxy, there are four possible
situations which may arise: (I) a stockholder of record' may sell his
shai;-es after giving a proxy to another to vote the stock, and the transfer may be registered on the books of the company; (2) such transfer
· may not be registered; (3) a stockholder of record date may sell his
shares, the transfer may be registered, and a proxy given by the original
192

Illustrative of the varying types of statutory provision are the following:
Cal. Civ. - Code ( I 94 I), § 3 I 8: "Unless the articles or by-laws otherwise
provide, the board of directors may fix a time, in the future, not exceeding thirty days
preceding the date of any meeting of shareholders, or the date fixed for the payment
of any dividend or distribution, or for the allotment of rights, or when any change or
conversion or exchange of shares shall go into effect, as a record date for the determination of the shareholders entitled to notice of and to vote at any such meeting or
entitled to receive any such dividend or distribution, or any such allotment of rights,
or to exercise the rights in respect to any such change, conversion, or exchange of
shares, and in such case only shareholders of record on the date so fixed shall be
entitled to notice of and to vote at such meeting or to receive such dividend, distribution or allotment of rights, or to exercise such rights, as the case may be, notwithstanding
any transfer of shares on the books of the corpor;ition after any record date fixed as
aforesaid. The board of directors may close the books of the corporation against
transfers of sJ.iares during the whole or any part of such period."
2. 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (furdon, 1938), § 2852-509: "Unless the by-laws otherwise provide, the board of directors may fix a time, not less than ten or more than
seventy days, prior to the date of any meeting of shareholders ••• or the date when any
change or conversion or exchange of shares will be made or go into effect, as a record
date for the determination of the shareholders entitled to notice of, and to vote at,
any such meeting.••• In such case, only such shareholders as shall be shareholders of
record on the date so fixed shall be entitled to notice of, and to vote at, such meeting
••• notwithstanding any transfer of any shares on the books of the corporation after any
record date fixed, as aforesaid•••. Unless a record date is fixed by the by-laws or
the board of directors for the direction of shareholders entitled to receive notice of,
or vcite at, a shareholders' meeting, transferees of shares which are transfered on the
books of the corporation within ten days next preceding the date of such meeting
shall not be entitled to notice of or to vote at such meeting."
For states having statutes of similar import, see the following: Ark. Stat. (Pope,
1937), § 2188 (40 days); Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 65, § 17 (50 days); Ga. Code
Ann. (Supp. 1941), § 22-1862 (30 days); Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133 (1)
(40 days); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), § 157.29 (not exceeding 40 and not
less than Io days prior to date of meeting) ; Mich. Gen. Corp. Act ( 193 I), § 3 2,
as amended by Pub. Acts (1937), No. 350, Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1941), § 21.32
(40 days); Mont. Rev. Code (1935), § 5971.1 (40 days); N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937),
§ 14:5-3 (30 days); 58 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940), "Stock Corporations
Law," § 47 (40 days); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-47 (not to exceed
45 days) •.
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owner of record after the sale; and (4) such transfer may not be
registered.
It seems that the same considerations should govern in determining
whether one who has transferred his shares can subsequently give a
proxy and whether a sale of shares of stock revokes a proxy given at a
prior date. But in this connection there are two conflicting principles
involved: (a) the principle that the right to vote shares of •stock is
inseparable from the right of ownership,193 and (b) the consideration
that a corporation is entitled to recognize only the holder of record on
the record date as the one entitled to vote. 194 Under principle (a), it
would follow that a proxy would be revoked by the subsequent sale
and assignment of shares.195 Likewise, one who purchases shares and
later takes a proxy from his vendor, but fails to have the transfer
recorded, would not be entitled to vote since his vendor was not at the
time of the meeting of the shareholders a stockholder and entitled to
vote. 196 But as indicated in (b), and as already developed, the registration of transfers on the books of the company may be a condition
upon the right to vote or the books of the company may be conclusive
evidence of stock ownership. And where the books of the company are
conclusive evidence of the right to vote, it may logically be contended
that the right to vot~ being in the record holder even though there is
a subsequent transfer, the transfer and assignment of the shares should
not act as an effective revocation of the proxy.
Thus, in Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company,191 plaintiff
contended that the inspectors of election had wrongfully counted
6 r ,400 shares which had been sold and transferred on the books of
Youngstown after the record date and before the 8th of April, the date
of the meeting. The owner of all these shares on the 22d of March
had given proxies to vote in favor of a contemplated merger. After
giving these proxies, and after the 22d of March, but prior to the meeting on the 8th of April, these shares were transferred on the books of
Youngstown to other transferees. The court held the objection by the
plaintiff was not well taken and said
193

1 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 116 (1914).
As illustrative of statutory provisions, see 58 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1940), "Stock Corporations Law,"§ 47; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-47.
195
Ryan v. Seaboard & R.R., (C.C. Va. 1898) 89 F. 397 at 406.
196
Dennistoun v. Davis, 179 Minn. 373, 229 N. W. 353 (1930).
197
46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N. E. 514 (1932), discussed by Goodbar, "The
Youngstown Litigation Discussed under the Law of New York," 11 BosT. UNtv. L.
REV. 376 (1931). See In re S. & S. Mfg. & Sales Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1917) 246 F.
I005.
194
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"· .. Under Section 8623-47, record holders of stock o~ the record
date were possessed of two rights in the corporation, one ownership of stock and the other the right to vote. He could sell one
and retain the other, or sell both. If the purchaser of this stock
wished to control the right to vote on the 8th of April, all he had
to do was to include in his purchase that right and secure a proxy,
withdrawing the one already given and granting the purchaser the
right to use the proxy." 198
The same considerations are present where the stockholder of
record transfers his shares of stock and then issues a proxy to vote the
same. As far as the writer has been able to find, no case has yet arisen
in which this problem has been considered, but it is submitted that such
a case should be so decided that the same result would be reached as
in the Youngstown case. Since the corporation is entitled to recognize
only the holder of record on the record date as the one eligible to vote,
it would seem to follow that such a person has the power to give a
proxy, even though he may have parted with the legal title to the
shares between the record date and the date of the meeting. Under the
conclusive type of statute, it would make no difference whether or not
the transferee of the shares had the transfer recorded on the books of
the company between the record date and the date of the meeting, for
it seems that the same result would be reached under such a statute in
any one of the four possible situations above indicated.
Where 'the books of the company are prima facie evidence of the
'right to vote, there is no doubt the transfer of shares of stock revokes
a proxy given at a prior time.199 Also, since the courts have the power
to inquire beyond the books of the company to determine who are
stockholders and entitled to vote, the transferor cannot give a valid
proxy after he has transferred and assigned his shares even though he
is the holder of record on the record date. Under this type of statute,
the registration of the transfer on the books of the company is of value
to the transferee in proving that he is the one entitled to vote. Where
registration is a condition on the right to vote, the transferee by a bill
in equity may compel the transferor to execute a proxy.200 But the
198
Wick v.'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 46 Ohio App. 253 at 261-262, 188
N. E. 514 (1932).
199
ln re Giant Portland Cement Co., (Del. Ch. 1941) 21 A. (2~) 697; Thompson v. Blaisdell, 93 N. J. L. 31, 107 A. 405 (1919).
200
In re- Argus Printing Co., l N. D. 434, 48 N. W. 347 (1891); Vowell v.
Thompson, 3 Cranch 428, 28 F. Cas. 1308, No. 17,023 (1829); Hoppin v. Buffum,
9 R. I. 513 (1870).
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New Jersey Supreme Court has held that there is no justification for
such a procedure where the transferee and the holder of the proxy are
identical and both parties satisfied as to who should vote.201

F. Partnership and Jointly Held Stocks
One partner of a firm, which owns stock in a corporation as a part
of its assets acquired in its regular business, has the power to vote that
stock at the meetings of the shareholders of the corporation.202 If there
are an even number of partners, the stock owned by the firm must be
voted as a unit, and if the partners disagree as to the vote, the right to
vote is nullified.203 The surviving partner, as liquidator of the firm
property, has the power to vote shares of stock standing in the firm
name on the books of the corporation.204 Where shares of stock are
owned by two or more persons jointly, and they cannot agree as to the
vote to be cast, neither can vote the stock.205

G. Right of Corporation to Vote Stock in Another Corporation
As a general rule a corporation holding stock in another corporation
is entitled to vote the stock by proxy.206 The right of a corporation
holding stock in another corporation to vote the stock by proxy has
received statutory sanction in a number of states.201 Likewise, a nonprofit corporation may vote shares of stock owned in another company.208
Thompson v. Blaisdell, 93 N. J. L. 31, 107 A. 405 (1919). Accord: Stephenson v. Vokes, 27 Ont. 691 (1896).
202 Kenton Furnace Railroad & Mfg. Co. v. McAlpin, (C.C. Ohio, 1880) 5 F.
73 7; People ex rel. Allen v. Hill, I 6 Cal. I I 3 ( I 860).
203
Post, note 205.
204 People ex rel. Allen v. Hill, I 6 Cal. II 3 ( I 860).
205
In re Lafferty's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 430, 26 A. 388 (1893); Tunis v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R. R., 149 Pa. St. 70, 24 A. 88 (1892); Highland· v. Empire
Nat. Bank of Clarksburg, I 14 W. Va. 473, 172 S. E. 544 (1933); In re Pioneer
Paper Co., 36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 111 (1865).
206
Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) 167 F. 721;
In re Indian Zoedone Co., 26 Ch. D. 70 (1884).
207
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 320b (4); Idaho Ann. Code (1932), § 29-133
(5); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), § 15z.30; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933),
§ 25-207 (e) (3); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939), § 1112 (VI); Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 21 (2); Mich. Gen. Corp. Act (1931), § 40, Stat. Ann.
(1937), § 21.40; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25 (IX); Ohio Gen.
Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-52; .15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 2852-508;
Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28 (6); Wis. Stat. (1941), §
180.15.
208
State v. Rohlffs, (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1890) 19 A. 1099.
201
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VIII
RIGHT TO EXAMINE PROXIES

Suppose the management in control of a corporation solicits proxies
from stockholders to obtain sufficient ballots to vote their continuance
in office. Subsequently a stockholder who is campaigning to oust existing directors at the stockholders' meeting notifies the management that
he intends to exercise his right as a stockholder and examine the proxies
received as a result of tf!e solicitation. It may be assumed that these·
_facts give rise to the following questions: (I) After the proxies have
been received, but before being acted upon at the meeting, may a
stockholder examine them? ( 2) May a stockholder examine the proxies
at the time of the annual meeting? (3) Does he have a right to examine
the proxies after they have been voted upon? Any discussion of the
questions involved should be premised upon the understanding that
no case has been found in which these have been directly or indirectly
raised. Nor apparently do any of the states have statutes expressly con{erring the right to examine proxies upon stockholders. Therefore, in
, view of the uncertainty that exists it seems worthwhile to examine the
questions in detail to determine, in so far as we can, what rules of law
should be invoked and what interests should ·be balanced in reaching
a practical solution.
·

A. Right to Examine Proxies Before the Meeting
. The right of a stockholder to inspect the proxies solicited by the
management may be supportable on one of two theories: First, the
right of, a stockholder to inspect the books and records of the corporation in which he owns stock; secondly, the right of a stockholder to
challenge the vote of any other stockholder.
·
At common law stockholders have a right to inspect corporate books
and records provided the request for inspection is made at a reasonable
time and for a reasonable purpose.200 The basis of the common-law
right of a stockholder to inspect the corporate books is succinctly stated
in the case of Huylar 'V. Cragin Cattle Co.,210 wherein the court said,
". . . And they are entitled to such inspection, though their
only object is to ascertain whether their affairs have been prop209
Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N. E. 764 (1915);
Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 80 N. E. 524 (1907); Guthrie v. Harkness, 199
U.S. 148, 26 S. Ct. 4 (1905) .
2
. ;o 40 N. J. Eq. 392 at 398, 2 A. 274 (1885).
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erly conducted by the directors or managers. Such a right is
necessary to their protection. To say that they have the right, but
that it can be ·enforced only when they have ascertained, in some
way without the books, that their affairs have' been mismanaged,
or that their interests are in danger, is practically to deny the
right in the majority of cases. Oftentimes, frauds are discoverable
only by examination of the books by an expert acountant. The
books are not the private property of the directors or managers,
but are the records of their transactions as trustees for the stockholders."
Most states have statutes which provide for the right of inspection,211 and in some of these states the right to inspect the corporate
books is made absolute. 212 But even in some of the states where the
right of inspection is made absolute a writ of mandamus has been refused by the courts when an improper motive appeared, on the ground
that the legislature did not intend that the discretionary power of the
court to issue or withhold a mandamus be changed.218
If a stockholder is prompted by a desire to prevent the voting of
invalid proxies, it would seem that the right to inspect the proxies could
not be denied since the examination is for a reasonable and proper purpose. Each stockholder is entitled to a valid and impartial vote, and
under such circumstances a stockholder would be asserting his right to
protect a legitimate interest which he poss~ses as a stockholder. But
the fact that the proxies are solicited by the management gives rise to
the following question: Are the proxies a part of the records of the
corporation prior to the meeting and before they are delivered to the
secretary of the meeting and canvassed by the inspectors of the election?
It is at this point that the analogy between the right to examine the
corporate books and the right to inspect the ~roxies solicited by the
management seems to break down. For, as we shall see, the proxy form
confers the authority to vote the stock but there is no compulsion to
act and the proxy holder can abandon his agency, subject to the risk
of liability.214 It would s,eem to follow, therefore, that the proxies
solicited by the management would not become a part of the records
of the corporation until they are acted upon at the corporate meeting.
211

5

FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS,

STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
212
218

Id.
5 FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA

STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
214

Infra, pp. 250-25x.-

perm. ed., § 2215 (1931);

428 (1936).
CORPORATIONS,

429 (1936).

~erm. ed., § 2220 (1931);

244

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Accordingly, a stockholder would not be entitled to examine the proxies
prior to the meeting. If, however, the corporate treasury bears the expense entailed in printing and mailing the proxies solicited by the
management, it may be argued that the proxies returned to the management become a part of the records of the corporation.215 Consequently, it is conceivable that under such circumstances the courts might
well grant the right to inspect the proxies solicited by the management.
As above indicated, the right of a stockholder to examine the proxies
solicited by. the management may be predicated upon his right to challenge the vote of any other stockholder. The charter or by-laws of a
corporation may require objections and challenges of votes to be made
in a certain manner or at a specified time. Under such circumstances,
the objections or challenges must be made in accordance with the provisions of the charter or by-laws.216 In several states the right ·of a
stockholder to challenge a vote at a corporate meeting is covered to
some extent by statute.211 Ordinarily the courts will not inquire into
the legality of a corporate election upon the ground that illegal votes
were voted, unless those votes were challenged at the time they were
cast and a:ffected the result of the election.218 Inasmuch as stockholders'
representation at corporate meetings has now become almost exclusively
215 It was held in Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del.
,
Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934), that where a faction is !=ampaigning to oust existing
directors and the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished
from personnel of management, the incumbent directors may make reasonable expenditures from the corporate treasury to inform stockholders of p9licies to be pursued and
to solicit proxies in their favor. But such expenditures are not proper if made solely
to maintain the incumbent directors in office. Thus, the court said, 20 Del. Ch. at
85, "if all that is at stake is the ambition of the 'ins' to stay in, the corporation should
not be called upon to pay for the expense of their campaign to persuade the voting
stockholders to rally to their support." Accord: Eberhard v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1914) 210 F. 520; Bounds v. Stephenson, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916) 187 S. W. 1031; Lawyer's Advertising Co. v. Consolidated -Railway,
·Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N. Y. 395, 80 N. E. 199 (1907).
216
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2017 (1931).
217
See, for example, Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 321b; Mich. Gen. Corp. Laws
(1931), § 41 as amended by Pub. Acts (1935), No. 194, Stat. Ann. (1937), § 21.41;
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 14:10-6; 58 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940),
"Stock Corporations Law," § 47; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), §. 8623-54; 15
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 2852-512.
218
In re Chenango County Mutual Ins. Co., 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 635 (1839);
In re United Towns Building & Loan Assn., 79 N. J. L. 31, 74 A. 310 (1909);
Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917); People ex
rel. Chritzman v. Crossley, 69 Ill. 195 (1873); Stevens v. Emergency Hospital of
Easton, 142 Md. 526, 121 A. 475 (1923); Commonwealth ex rel. Clark v. Roydhouse, 233 Pa. 234, 82 A. 74 (1911).
•
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by proxy, it may be argued that it would be impossible for a stockholder
to challenge corporate elections unless given the opportunity to examine the proxies a reasonable time prior to the corporate meeting.
If such a privilege were extended to stockholders and use made thereof,
it might tend to expedite the voting at corporate elections. On the other
hand, it may be contended that it is decidedly undesirable because of
the inconvenience and hardship ·placed upon the management at the
very time when every effort is being expended to segregate and check
the incoming proxies. The stockholder's privilege of ex~mining the
proxies should be determined by balancing his individual interest
against the nuisance value to the management. In this balancing process, provided, of c0urse, the purpose of the stockholder is to protect
his private interests as a stockholder and his request to examine the
proxies is made at a reasonable time, it does not appear that he should
be barred because of the inconvenience caused the management.

B. Right to Examine _Proxies at the Meeting
The relation between the right of a stockholder to examine the
proxies at the meeting and prior to the meeting of the stockholders is
evident. If a stockholder is entitled to inspect the proxies solicited by
the management prior to the meeting, then, of course, that right should
exist at the time of the meeting. The exercise of such a right at the
meeting need not be based on the analogy of the right to examine e0rporate books and records, although such an analogy could be logically
maintained if the corporate treasury bears the expense entailed in soliciting the proxies. Rather it is grounded upon the right of a stockholder
to challenge the vote of any other stockholder and the necessity of an
examination in order to make an intelligent challenge. As a matter of
policy, independent of analysis, it would seem that the right to inspect
the proxies at the meeting is an indispensable prerequisite to the stockholder's right to challenge the vote of any other stockholder.
I

.

C. Right to Examine Proxies After the Meeting
Obviously if there is any right to examine the proxies after the
meeting it must be based upon the analogy of the right to inspect the
corporate books. Once the proxies have been acted upon at the corporate meeting and filed by the secretary of the meeting they undoubtedly
become a part of the permanent records of the corporation. After the
proxies have been voted, there seems to be no real reason why such an
examination should not be included in the general right of inspection.
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IX
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY CONFERRED AND EXERCISE OF POWER

A. Authority under Proxy-In General
Attempts have been made to classify proxies as general and special;
the latter authorizing the proxy holder to vote at a particular meeting,
the former at any and all meetings. 219 The scope of the special proxy
is further curtailed to the extent that the proxy holder is given, either
in general or by specific terms, t)ie authority to vote only upon particular proposals that are to come before the meeting. Thus, where proxy
holders who were authorized to vote for directors, solely, disregarded
the authority conferred by the proxy and voted to ratify a sale of the
property of the corporation, the stockholders for whom they assumed
to act were not bound.22° Furthermore, if a proxy holder who holds
general proxies for certain stockholders and, urges them to send him
special proxies to represent them at a certain meeting and notifies them
that if they do not respond he will assume they authorize him to represent them under the general'proxies, the court will not assume that by
silence they gave consent, but rather that if special authority was
needed, and was not given, the proxy holder did not have it.221 However, a proxy authorizing the proxy holder to vote at an election of
directors as fully as the stockholder could if personally present gives
the proxy holder the right to vote on the question of adjournment
and the opening of ballots.222 According to text book writers the scope
of authority conferred in a general proxy is authorization to vote upon
matters which in the ordinary course of corporate affairs can legally
come before the meeting.228 And, as we shall see, general proxies conferring upon the proxy holder the authority to vote upon all matters
that might come before the meeting in the ordinary and usual course are
generally not considered wide enough in scope to empower the proxy
holder to vote upon extraordinary or unusual matters coming before
the meeting of shareholders.224
Obviously, any attempt to classify proxies as special and general
and to ·assign each class· a definite connotation is bound to give way
219
22

2 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs, 3d ed.,

§ 973 (1927).

°Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman,

30 Barb. (N.Y.) 553 (1859).
McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N. W. 609 (1904).
222
Forsyth v. Brown, 2 Pa. Dist. 765 (1893).
223
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 2060 (1931);
STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 468 (1936).
224
Infra, p. 246 ff.
221

1942]

CORPORATE PROXIES

247

before the multiplicity of situations arising at stockholders' meetings.
But it will not do to throw away such terms altogether, rather it will
be better to make them over to meet present conditions. For convenience of discussion, the terms general and special will be retained.
However, there is no magic in these words, and the extent to which
the grantor of the proxy is bound may depend either upon the wording
of the instrument or upon the information he has received as to proposals to be considered at the meeting. Such information may be derived from the notice of the meeting, from letters soliciting his proxy,
or from other reliable sources. For example, under the provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of r934, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been given certain regulatory powers with respect to solicitation of any proxy, or consent or authorization, if the security in respect
of which the proxy, consent or authorization solicited is registered on a
national securities exchange.225 Pursuant to the powers conferred, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted rules requiring the
presentation of certain information to each person from whom such a
proxy, consent or authorization is solicited.220 This information is designed to disclose to security holders information essential to a determination of the question presented to them and to enable them to decide
whether or not to give or withhold the proxy. Thus, the holder of any
security registered on any national securities exchange would be bound
by the vote of his proxy holder upon all matters described in the proxy
soliciting material, since he would have notice of such proposals when
he executed the proxy.
A few examples of general or unrestricted proxies will suffice to
show the extent of the authority generally conferred. For instance,
such proxies usually authorize the proxy holder described therein "to
attend and vote at the meeting with all the powers the undersigned
would possess if personally present," 221 or "to exercise all the power
[ the stockholder] would possess if personally present," 228 or "to vote
225
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14 (a), 48 Stat. L. 895", 15 U. S. C.
(1940), § 78n (a).
226 The Securities and Exchange Commission, on September 24, 1935, in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 378, adopted rules LA1-LA7. In Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 1823, issued August II, 1938, the commission, pursuant to§ 14 (a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, adopted Regulation X-14 (comprising Rules
X-14A-1 to X-14A-9), effective October 1, 1938. Rules LAI to LA7, inclusive,
were rescinded. On January 12, 1940, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in
Release No. 2376, announced amendments to its rules, effective February I 5, 1940.
227 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172 at 187, 165 A.
136 (1933).
228 Farish v. Cieneguita C~pper Co., 12 Ariz. 235 at 241, 100 P. 781 (1909).
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in all matters_ which may come before the meeting." 229 Arid where a
stockholder executes such a proxy as is above illustrated, or one similar
thereto, he is, as a general rule, deemed to have conferred upon his
proxy holder a discretion to act upon all matters that may properly
come before a regular meeting of the shareholders.230 Such matters as
the opening of ballots, election of directors, and motion to adjourn the
meeting, have been considered matters properly coming before the
meeting upon which the holder of a proxy may vote. 231 But the decisions deny there is any authorization under a general proxy to vote
for the sale of all corporate assets,232 or for its reorganization into another corporation of a di:fferent state,233 or to abandon and surrender
the charter of the company,m or for a voluntary liquidation of its
a:ffairs,235 or for dissolution and winding up.236 On the other hand, a
few cases have held that the holder of a general proxy may vote upon
such extraordinary and unusual matters. It is submitted, however, that
these cases may be reconciled on the ground that the stockholders
executing the proxies had been advised that these extraordinary propositions would be submitted at the meeting or were aware of the financial
condition of the company and must be regarded as having notice that
such extraordinary matters would be likely to arise in the usual course
of the annual meeting. Therefore, if the stockholder executing the
proxy had notice that such unusual matters were to be considered, or
was aware of the financial status of the company and knew that definite
action was necessary if ·the company were to continue to operate, there
229

McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731 at 735, 98 N. W. 609

(1904).
230
Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933); Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d)
743·
231
Forsyth v. Brown, 2 Pa. Dist. 763 (1893); Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co.,
12 Ariz. 235, JOO P. 781 (1909). In this case the court said: "Comprehensive
though the instruments are in conferring 'all the power that' the principals 'would
possess if personally present at such meeting,' it is quite manifest that the authority
is not unlimited. The principals, while present at the annual meeting, would, in their
individual capacities, have all their ordinary powers. They could as individuals execute
promissory notes, release mortgages, and accomplish any other of their ordinary
activities. The wording of the instruments, if broadly construed, authorizes the proxies
to do all of these ordinary acts."
232
Shield v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 202 S. W. 2n;
Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 578 (1861).
233
Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co., 12 Ariz. 235, JOO P. 781 (1909).
234
Smith v. Smith, 3 Desaus. Eq. (S. C.) 557 (1813).
235
McKee v. Home Sa:vings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N. W. 609 (1<jo4).
236
Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917).
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should be no inherent obstacle to a general authorization covering these
extraordinary transactions, for such propositions are within the contemplation of the shareholder when he executes the proxy.287

B. Duty of Proxy Holder
The proxy holder is an agent for the grantor of the proxy, and
necessarily under a duty to vote for the best interests of his principal.288
And the holder of the proxy, in the exercise of the authority conferred
by the proxy, must comply with the instructions given either openly
or tacitly.239 He does not have the authority or power to vote upon a
237 Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136
(1933). Proposal voted upon: amendment of by-laws to increase number of directors.
Under article VII, section 1, it was always in order at any annual meeting for the
stockholders, without prior notice, to consider an amendment of the by-laws. But
even if this were not so, the letter of solicitation put the stockholder on notice that
radical action was contemplated. Leininger v. North American Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
II5 Neb. 801, 215 N. W. 167 (1927). Proposal voted upon: transformation of a
mutual life insurance company to a stock company. Stockholder executing proxy had
warning of the construction being placed upon the proxies solicited. McClean v.
Bradley, (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) 299 F. 379. Proposal voted upon: ratification of a
chattel mortgage taken by the directors of the corporation on certain patents issued
to the corporation. Stockholders were aware of the precarious financial condition of
the company and that drastic action was necessary. This is reflected by the letter
written by one stockholder to another in which he says, among other things, that the
sale of the property "is likely to destroy all chances of further efforts on the part of
the company. It would be useless for me to go to the meeting. Pretty sad for a lot
of us." 299 F. at 384. Even if the stockholders, who were parties to this action,
were not bound by the vote of their proxies, there would have been sufficient votes
at the annual meeting to ratify the chattel mortgage. Baker v. Seattle-Tacoma Power
Co., 61 Wash. 578, 112 P. 647 (1911). Proposal voted upon: ratification of the
purchase of certain competitive power companies by a syndicate organized by the
president of the Seattle-Tacoma Power Company, the latter company not having
adequate funds to make the purchase. The stockholders were aware that insolvency
was threatened and that some such action was necessary if the Seattle-Tacoma Power
Company was to continue to operate. Furthermore, the members of the syndicate did
make certain disclosures to certain stockholders who issued proxies. Tilden v. Quaker
Oats Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1924) 1 F. (2d) 160. Proposal voted upon: sale of good
will and transfer of interstate business of Great Western Cereal Company to Quaker
Oats Company. Stockholders were aware that the company had become incapable of
carrying on its interstate trade and commerce, was on the verge of self-extinction,
necessitating liquidation of its affairs. Furthermore, there was an allegation merely
that the directors concealed from the stockholders their intention to vote for ratification of a contract previously made. This allegation was insufficient to support the
contention that the corporation did not lawfully assent to the contract.
238 BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

245 (1932).
239 Bache v. Central Leather Co., 78 N.

J. Eq.

484, 81 A. 571 (19u).
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proposal if it is illegal or contrary to public policy, inasmuch as his
principal could not vote upon such a matter if he were personally present.240 Neither does the holder of the proxy have the power to act in
the capacity of a creditor of the corporation; he has the authority to act
as the representative of a stockholder only.241 The stockholder who is
represented by a proxy holder is not bound where the one to whom
the proxy is given acts in bad faith, 242 or in collusion with wrongdoers
against, or in fraud of, him. 243 Furthermore, the grantor of the proxy
is justified in revoking the authority granted in the proxy where the
holder of the proxy intends to use the proxy to promote an iniquitous
project of his own.244 Directors of a corporation who also form the
proxy committee are under a duty to vote for the best interests of the
corporation as a whole, and the vote may be invalidated if cast to serve
purposes of their own. Thus, in Rice & Hutchins v. Triplex Shoe
Co.,245 the Chancellor was considering a case involving the ratification
at an annual meeting of stockholders of a resolution purporting to issue
stock, to certain directors of the corporation for an illegal consideration,
where the attempted ratification was based on a vote of a general proxy
given to two of those same directors. The Chancellor held that a g~neral proxy did not commit the stockholder to an act done by the proxy
holder solely in his own peculiar interest. And in Blair v. F. H. Smith
Co.,246 where the court was considering a similar situation, the Chancellor said,
" .•• General proxies given to an agent cannot be used by the
holder to commit the principals to acts done by the agent for his
own aggrandizement so as to estop the principals from complaining
thereat, unless the principal was advised of the proposed action in
advance and expressly or impliedly approved thereof."

A proxy holder owes the same fiduciary duty to the grantor of the
proxy that an agent owes to his principal in business transactions. The
holder of the proxy, therefore, may be held legally accountable if he
does not cast his vote for the best interest of his principal. For example,
240 Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893).
241 Moore v. Ensley, 112 Ala. 228, 20 So. 744 (1896).
242 Lowman v. Harvey R. Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 120 A. 404 (1923).
243 McClean v. Bradley, (C. C. A. ,6th, 1924) 299 F. 379; Wellington Bull

&

Co. v. Morris, 132 Misc. 509, 230 N. Y. S. 122 (1928),affd. 226 App. Div. 868,
235 N. Y. S. 906 (1929).
244 Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 6 Paige (N. Y. 337 (1837).
245 16 Del. Ch. 298, 147 A. 317 (1929).
246 18 Del. Ch. 150 at 160, 156 A. 207 (1931).
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in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Taylor 241 the court made the
following statement in connection with a vote cast by the president of
the association acting as the proxy holder of Taylor, a member of the
association,
"It is unquestionably the duty of an agent to act for the interest
of his principal to the best of the agent's judgment and, belief, and,
if his acts are so clearly against such interest as to show that he
acted otherwise, his act is void, and the principal is not bound,
except to an innocent party."
Similarly, in Rice & Hutchins v. Triplex Shoe Co.,248 the Chancellor,
in speaking of the fiduciary obligation of a proxy holder, said,
". . . A person acting as proxy for another is but the latter's
agent and owes to the latter the duty of acting in strict accord with
those requirements of a fiduciary relationship which inhere in the
conception of agency. If directors who are agents of the stockholders are inve_sted with a fiduciary character which inhibits them
from passing judgment where their own peculiarly personal interests are involved ... I am unable to see why on principle the
same sort of inhibition is not imposed on those who act as proxies
for a stockholder." 249

C. Representation at Meeting of Stockholders
As a general rule, where a stockholder is represented at a stockholders' meeting by a duly constituted proxy he is bound by the action
taken at the meeting to the same extent as if he were personally present.250 The proxy confers the authority to vote the shares of stock, but
there is no compulsion to act and the proxy holder can abandon his
m 99 Va. 208 at 219, 37 S. E. 854 (1901).
248

16 Del. Ch. 298 at 309, 147 A. 317 (1929).
"The philosophy expressed above would appear to apply only where a proxy
had discretionary powers; the proposition that a proxy is a fiduciary would hardly
seem applicable where the stockholder directs the manner in which it shall be voted."
249

SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE CoMMISSION, REPORT ON THE WoRK, AcTiv1T1ES, PER-

pt. VII,
p. 8, note 13 (1938). The S. E. C. comment does not seem extremely enlightening:
if the grantor of a proxy directs the manner in which it is to be voted, how could any
question of fiduciary duty arise?
25
°Crook v. International Trust Co. of Maryland, 32 D. C. App. 490 (1909).
But giving a proxy to vote at a stockholders' meeting does not constitute such represent:ition as to be considered personally present for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction
on a cour_t under an in personam judgment. Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn.
224, 178 N. W. 735 (1920).
SONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES,
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agency, subject, of course, to the risk of liability if the circumstances
are such that the law attaches liability.251 The mere presence of the
proxy holder at the meeting does not amount to the representation of
the grantor of the proxy; not only must the proxy holder be present
but he must also purport to act for his principaL But the grantor of_the
proxy is as much bound by the errors and mistakes of his proxy holder
in casting the votes as if he had been present and himself committed
the error.252 And neither the proxy holder nor hii principal can set up
the ignorance or inexperience of the proxy holder as an excuse for the
failure to vote as instructed. Similarly, the person executing the proxy
may be bound, where the holder of the proxy has acted within the scope
of his authority, even though the proxy holder votes against the interest of his principal, unless there is a showing of bad faith, fraud, or
collusion.258
As above indicated, the proxy confers- the authority to vote, but
there is no compulsion on the part of the holder of the proxy to act
for his principal. This presents a very practical question: where the
shares of stock represented by proxy are necessary for a quorum and
the holder of the proxy is present at the meeting but refuses to act for
his principal, is there sufficient number of shares of stock represented
at the meeting to constitute a quorum? An example of a situation where
the proxies held by the proxy committee were essential to the existence
of a quorum and the members of the committee withdrew before the
proxies were presented to the meeting is Duffy v. Loft, Inc. 254 The
annual meeting was opened at the proper time by the president, who
was also a member of the proxy committee. The proxies held by the
committee were essential to the existence of a quorum. An announcement by the president that he wanted to make a report b.efore calling
251
Duffy v. Loft, _,,Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 140; 151 A. 223 (1930), affd. 17 Del.
Ch. 376, l 52 A. 849 ( l 930); see Ernest v. Loma Gold Mines, [ l 896] 2 Ch. 572, affd.
[ l 897] l Ch. l. It not infrequently happens that a stockholder changes the proxy
form, as, for example, striking out, or inserting, as the case may be, the word "not"
in the clause for ratifying the directors' acts. The question arises: is the management
proxy holder required to vote such a proxy? The answer is "no." Such proxies are
usually returned with a letter saying that the persons named as proxy holders do not
feel that they should vote the proxy, since they do not agree with the proxy given as
to the merits of the proposition in question, etc.
252 In re Mathiason Mfg. Co., 122 Mo. App. 437, 99 S. W. 502 (1906).
258
McClean v. Bradley, (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) 299 F. 379; Wellington Bull &
Co. v. Morris, 132 Misc. 509, 230 N. Y. S. 122 (1928), affd. 226 App. Div. 868,
235 N. Y. S. 906 (1929).
254
17 Del. Ch. 140, 151 A. 223 (1930), affd., 17 Del. Ch. 376, 152 A. 849
(1930).
>
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the meeting to order was objected to by the persons present at the
meeting, who demanded that the meeting be called to order and a
chairman elected. The president called for a roll call and the shareholders insisted that the procedure fixed by the by-laws be followed._
During the ensuing excitement, the president and other members of
the· proxy committee withdrew. The subsequent proceedings were
attacked on the ground that no quorum was present. The Chancellor
found that there was a majority of stock represented at the meeting and
the Delaware Supreme Court was also of the opinion thaf the evidence
warranted his finding. It is well settled that a shareholder may not
break a quorum if the meeting is once organized and the parties have
participated.255 Consequently, the rule enunciated in the Duffy case
seems highly desirable when considered from the angle that the president and other members of the proxy committee knew or suspected they
were whipped in the proxy fight. Furthermore, the court's decision
seems in line with the position taken by the courts to require meetings
to proceed and thereby save the expense involved in starting another
meeting. 256

X

w HEN STOCKHOLDER IS BOUND BY PROXY HOLDER'S
UNAUTHORIZED AcT

The acts of the proxy holder in question here are beyond the express authority conferred upon him by the proxy, or any apparent
authority he may have in excess of the actual authority conveyed by the
proxy, to perform. One of the general questions to be considered is,
what information held by the proxy holder will be imputed to the
grantor of the proxy? A related issue concerns the effect of mere passive inaction or silence after the grantor of the proxy acquires knowledge of what transpired at the meeting of the shareholders. These and
similar questions have been passed upon by the courts, and the circumstances under which the stockholder giving the proxy is deemed
to have ratified the unauthorized act of his proxy holder, or to have
waived any objection thereto, or is estopped from objecting to such an
act, will be considered in this section.
255
Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 145 A. 115 (1929);
Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.; (Del. Ch. 1941) 20 A. (2d) 743;
2 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs, 3d ed., § IOIO (1927).
256
For an excellent disrussion of the question of a stockholder preventing a
quorum by withdrawing before the meeting has been called to order, see 79 UN1v. PA.
'L. REV. 223 (1930).
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A. l'fotice Through Proxy Holder
Where a stockholder is represented at a stockholders' meeting by
a proxy holder, he is, as a general rule, charged with knowledge of
facts connected with the proceedings of the meeting. 257 Or to paraphrase the words of the court in Thames v. Central City Insurance
Co.,258 what the proxy holder knows, he knows as well for the person
executing the proxy as for himself. But where the facts ·have been
generally w;ithheld from the grantors of the proxies by the directors
and no report is made at the meeting, the knowledge of the directors
acting as proxy holders is not imputed to the grantors. 259 Likewise,
the person who has been induced by fraud to subscribe for stock and
gives the perpetrator of the fraud a proxy to represent him at the meeting of the shareholders is not charged with knowledge of the fraud by
the disclosure of the facts in regard thereto at the meeting, at which
he was not personally present.200 Knowledge which a proxy holder has
acquired before the proxy was given need not be communicated to the
grantor of the proxy; nor.is such knowledge imputed to hiin.201

B. Ratification
Where a person assumes to act for the owner of stock as proxy
holder without authority or in excess of authority actually conferred,
the owner of the stock may elect to ratify or repudiate such acts. And
a vote cast at a meeting of the stockholder~ under such circumstances
will be ratified by any subsequent conduct of-the stockholder inconsistent with an intent to repudiate it. Thus, in Hoene v. Pollak 262
257

Seaman v. Ironwood Amusement Corp., 283 Mich. 220, 278 N. W. 51
(1938); Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N. C. 7, 12 S. E. (2d) 686 (1941);
Trinity-Universal Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, (Tex. Civ. ~pp. 1937) IOI S. W. (2d) 606;
2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §§.1813, 1815 (1914).
258
49 Ala. 577 (1873).
259 Tooker v. National Sugar Refining Co., So N. J. Eq. 305, 84 A. IO (1912);
2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1813, 1815 (1914).
There is a stock provision in most proxies authorizing the approval of the action
taken by the directors and officers since the last annual meeting. Since the proxy committee is usually selected by the management, any approval by them, as a proxy
committee, of the board of directors' or officers' action wherein the latter were liable
to the corporation should not constitute corporate approval. It would appear that on
general agency principles the court would arrive at this conclusion.
260
Virginia Land Co. v. Haupt, 90 Va. 533, 19 S. E. 168 (1894).
261 Moore v. Ensley, 112 Ala. 228, 20 So. 744 {1896). See, 2 MECHEM,
AGENCY, 2d ed.,§ 1815 (1914).
262 u8 Ala. 617, 24 So. 349 {1897). See, I MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed. § 372
(1914).
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where a married woman, knowing her husband had in her behalf voted
the stock she owned in the Hoene Warrier & Je:fferson Coal Company
in favor of a transfer of all the corporate property to another corporation, the property to be paid for by the capital stock of the corporation
to which it was conveyed, received her share of the stock and disposed
of a part thereof, it was held that she thereby assented to and ratified
the act of her husband. Furthermore, the stockholder's passivity may
be evidence of an assent from which an inference of affirmance of the
unauthorized act may be drawn. 268 The ordinary rules governing the
ratification by the principal of acts of his agent apply as between a
stockholder and his proxy holder. It follows, therefore, that knowledge
of the material facts is necessary before the stockholder will be deemed
to have ratified the acts of the proxy holder who purported to act for
him. 264 But to safeguard himself lest he be held to have ratified by
acquiescence, a stockholder must exercise due diligence to discover what
transpired at the meeting. 265 It is difficult to determine definitely what
constitutes due diligence in a particular case. A period of thirty-five
days has been held not to constitute laches in bringing a suit to set
aside an election.266 On the other hand, six months delay before bringing suit to set aside a sale and conveyance made by a corporation of all
its property precluded the objecting stockholders from maintaining the
action. 261

C. Estoppel and Waiver Through Proxy Holder
A stockholder who participates in the meeting of the stockholders
by proxy is estopped from questioning any irregularity in the proceedings taken, or in the call of the meeting, which could have been waived
1 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 453 (1914).
Moore v. Ensley, 112 Ala. 228, 20 So. 744 (1896).
265
Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N. W. 254 (1917). In
this case the court said: "A stockholder is bound by the action of his proxy at a stockholders meeting, unless he exercises the most active diligence in repudiating the same,
where he knows or should have known what was done at the meeting." But a stockholder is not estopped by !aches until he knows that his rights are being infringed.
Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co., 12 Ariz. 235, 100 P. 781 (1909). If, however,
the stockholder could have acquired knowledge of what was done at the meeting by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and care in respect to his business, knowledge will
be imputed to him. Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. Loan Assn., (C. C. A. 6th, 1902)
II7 F. 379·
266
Moore v. Ensley, II2 Ala. 228, 20 So. -744 (1896).
267
Wright v. Tacoma Gas & Electric Light Co., 53 Wash. 262, IOI P. 865
(1909).
268
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by the stockholder if personally present.268 And it has also been held
that a stockholder who was represented at a stockholders' meeting by
an authorized proxy holder is estopped to contend that his proxy, or
the proxies of other stockholders, should not have been recognized,
even though the right to vote by proxy is not given by statute, articles
of incorporation, or the by-laws of the corporation.269 Furthermore,
where no action is taken at a stockholders' meeting, but a false statement is made that it has been, and another party is misled thereby to
his detriment, the parties making the same in person or by proxy may
be estopped to deny that such action was taken. 270 Where a stockholder
participates in a meeting by an authorized proxy holder several months
after he has given the corporation notice of the withdrawal of his stock,
he is deemed to have waived his right to withdraw. 211

XI
REVOCATION AND TERMINATION OF PROXIES

'!'.he duration of the authority conferred upon a proxy holder by a
stockholder authorizing a proxy vote may be specified in the instrument or the validity may be. restricted by statute to a specified period
of time after execution.272 Unless the authority conferred by the ·proxy
is restricted in the instrument or by statute, the proxy 273 is generally
valid until the purpose for which it is given is accomplisl).ed or until it
is revoked by the grantor. Ordinarily the authority may be revoked
by the grantor at any time, unless the proxy is coupled with an interest. 274 It has been a common practice to solicit proxies irrevocable in
268

Columbia Nat. Bank of Tacoma v. Mathews, (C. C. A. 9th, 1898) 85 F.
934; Foote v: Greilick, 166 Mich. 636, 132 N. W. 473 (19u).
269
Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co., 12 Ariz. 235, IOO P. 781 (1909).
27
°Crook v. International Trust Co. of Maryland, 32 D. C. App. 490 (1909).
271
Decatur Bldg. & Investment Co. v. Neal, 97 Ala. 717 (1893).
272
lnfra, 258-259.
273 Accurately speaking the instrument called the proxy is merely evidence of the
authority conferred by the grantor authorizing a proxy vote. See Duffy v. Loft, Inc.,
17 Del. Ch. 140, 151 A. 223 (1930), affd. 17 Del. Ch. 376, 152 A. 849 (1930).
In this section the phrase "revocation of the proxy" will be used occasionally to avoid
becoming tediously iterative. · When so employed, the word proxy is used as a symbol
for the authority conferred by the stockholder and evidenced by the instrument.
274 Schmidt v. Mitchell, IOI Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929 (1897); Tucker v. Russell,
(C. C. N. C. 1897) 82 F. 263; State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67
N. E. 207 (1903); Wm. Randall & Sons v. Lucke, 123 Misc. 5, 205 N. Y. S. 121
(1924); Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350, 271 N. Y. S.
510 (1934); Simpson v. Neilson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1926); Gage v.
Fisher, 5 N. D. 297, 65 N. W. 809 (1895); Babcock v. Chicago Rys., 325 Ill. 16,
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terms, but in fact legally revocable. 275 Obviously, such proxies may
be revoked even though stated to be irrevocable.276 By the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under authority
of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all proxy
statements must state specifically whether or not the granter of the
proxy has the power to revoke. 211 And if the grantor's power to revoke
.is subject to any conditions, these conditions must be summarized.278
Attempts have been made to unite permanently the voting power
of several stockholders, without undertaking to create a trust in the
stock itself, by giving irrevocable proxies or powers to specified persons.210 But in most instances where such attempts have been made they
have failed because the courts have permitted the stockholders to revoke the proxies or powers at any time, even though irrevocable in
terms. 280
Where the power or the authority conferred by the proxy is coupled
with an interest, and is not contrary to public policy, the person grant155 N. E. 773 (1927); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1914); Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N. C. 776, 64 S. E. 894 (1909); Harvey v.
Linville Imp. Co., 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896). See, also, Warren v. Pim,
66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (1904).
See generally, I MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §§ II6, 585, note 61 (1914);
Seavey, "Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney," 31 YALE L. J.
283 (1922); Lowndes, "Powers Coupled with an Interest," 12 HARV. L. REv. 262
(1898); 64 A. L. R. 380 (1929).
275 SEcURITIEs AND ExcHANGE CoMM1ss10N, REPORT oN THE WoRK, AcT1v1Trns,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Pt.
VII, pp. 129-130 (1938).
276 Schmidt v. Mitchell, IOI Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929 (1897); Woodruff v.
Dubuque & S. C.R. R., (C. C. N. Y. 1887) 30 F. 91; Sheppard v. Rockingham
Power Co., 150 N. C. 776, 64 S. E. 894 (1909); Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec.
(Repr.) 627, 19 Abb. N. C. 457 (1886); Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co., 118 N. C.
693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896). See also, Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92,
12 So. 723 (1893); Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 So. 742 (1888); Luthy v. Ream,
270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1914); Warren v. Pim, 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773
(1904); Kreiss} v. Distilling Co. of America, 61 N. J. Eq. 5, 47 A. 471 (1900).
277 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1823, August 11, 1938, Schedule 14A,
Item x(a).
278 Id., Item 1 (b).
279 A consideration of the question of the legal status of the voting trust and
other similar agreements is beyond the scope of this paper and the writer has made
no attempt to discuss the question.
280 Schmidt v. Mitchell, ,101 Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929 (1897); In re Public
Industrial Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82 (1933); Woodruff v. Dubuque & S.
C. R. R., (C. C. N. Y. 1887) 30 F. 91; Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec. (Repr.)
627, 19 Abb. N. C. 460 (1886); Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A.
32 (1890); Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N. C. 776, 64 S. E. 894
(1909); Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co., II8 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896).
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ing the proxy is usually not permitted to withdraw .at his pleasure.
Proxies may be made· irrevocable by giving the proxy holder some
". . . recognizable property or financial interest in the stock
in respect of which the voting power is to be exercised by him, as
distinguished from an interest in the corporation generally, on the
one hand, and an interest in the bare voting power or the results
to be accomplished by the use of it, on the other hand." 281
Reciprocal proxies to joint owners,282 and proxies to vote stock for a
named period given in order to secure a change of management and
new capital,283 to carry out a contract for the acquisition of stock by the
majority stockholders from the minority over a period of twenty years,
during which the stock was to be held by the majority stockholders as
depositaries, 284 to secure creditors whose claims were secured by debentures,285 and to carry out the terms of a contract for the acquisition
of control of a corporation,286 have been held to be irrevocable.287
281

ln re Public Industrial Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 398 at 409, 168 A. 82 (1933).
Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun 230, 32 N. Y. S. 627 (1895).
288
Craig v. Bessie Furnace Co., 19 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 545, 27 Ohio Dec. (N.
P.) 471 (1917).
284
Groub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N. E. 609, 153 N. E. 895 (1928).
285
Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893).
286 Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
287
See also; White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 P. 927 (1909); ThompsonStarrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 A. 1017 (1912); Gray v. Bloomington & N. Ry., 120 Ill. App. 159 (1905); C;irnagie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co.
of America, II I Va. I, 6 8 S. E. 412 ( 191 o). In connection with voting trust agreements see Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 A. 103 (1910); Kreiss! v. Distilling Co.
of America, 61 N. J. Eq. 5, 47 A. 471 (190(?).
An agreement to give an irrevocable proxy is not necessarily void as contrary
to public policy. See, Brown v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 5 Blatch. 525, 4 F. Cas.
420, No. 2,025 (1867). But in some jurisdictions by statute an irrevocable proxy or
power is contrary to public policy. See 58 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940),
"Stock Corporations Law,"§ 47; 39 id. (1938), "Penal Law,"§ 668. See also, 22 id.
(1929), "General Corporations Law," § 19, which states that proxies are revocable.
An earlier New York statute (Laws of 1890, c. 564, § 54) declaring every proxy
revocable was so construed as to prevent the creation of a proxy coupled with an
interest. Re Germicide Co., 65 Hun 606, 20 N. Y. S. 495 (1892). See also, In re
Glen'Salt Co., 17 App. Div. 234, 45 N. Y. S. 568 (1897). In addition to New York,
at least one other state provides by statute that no stockholder shall sell his vote or issue
a proxy to vote any stock for any sum of money or anything of value. See 15 Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 2852-504.
Included in the items of information to be inserted in a proxy statement as set
forth in the S. E. C.'s official Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1823, dated
August I I, 1938, is the statement whether the grantor has the power to revoke, and
if the grantor's power to revoke is subject to express conditions, there must be included
a brief summary of the condjtions. See, Schedule 14A, Items 1(a) and 1(b).
282
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Where the person giving the proxy or power contemplates the execution of an irrevocable proxy or power, it may be deemed irrevocable
even though it is not expressly to be so on the face of the instrument.288
But even a proxy coupled with an interest-may be revoked if it is being
used for a fraudulent purpose,289 or when several persons are given a
joint proxy and cannot agree on a vote. 290
In the absence of controlling provisions in the statute, certificate
of incorporation, or by-laws, it is not· essential that the authority conferred by the proxy be revoked in any particular manner. In fact, it is
not even essential that the authority be revoked in the exact manner
provided in the instrument conferring the authority. 291 When the stockholder has delivered his proxy and then changes his mind and wants
to revoke the authority conferred upon the proxy holder, he may do
so by notifying the company of the revocation, and the notice may be
formal or informal. He can also attend the meeting of the shareholders
and vote his stock in person. This will nullify the authority given by
the proxy. 292 Mere appearance of the grantor of the proxy at the meeting of the shareholders is sufficient to revoke the authority of the proxy
holder where the statute limits the right to vote by proxy to absent
stockholders. 293 The sale of stock may also revoke the authority previously given by the grantor of the proxy.294 Similarly, the execution of a
subsequent proxy cancels all prior proxies, and if the inspectors of the
election are unable to determine which of two proxies were last executed, neither can be voted. 295 Where.a proxy is executed by a majority
of the directors of a dissolved corporation, the efficacy of the proxy is
destroyed by the subsequent withdrawal of approval by part of such
majority, the remaining signers being less than a majority. 296 This
would apply to all cases of common ownership where the action to be
taken is determined by the vote of the majority of the owners. Like
any other agency relationship that is not coupled with an interest, the
Chapman v. Bates, 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 A. 638 (1900).
Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 337 (1837).
290
Sullivan v. Parks, 69 App. Div. 221, 74 N. Y. S. 787 (1902).
291
Schmidt v. Mitchell, IOI Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929 (1897).
292
Commonwealth ex rel. Langdon v. Patterson, 158 Pa. St. 476, 27 A. 998
(1893); In re Schwartz & Gray, 77 N. J. L. 415, 72 A. 70 (1909); Bache v. Central
Leather Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 484, 81 A. 571 (19u).
293
Bache v. Central Leather Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 484, 81 A. 571 (19u)·; In re
Schwartz & Gray, 77 N. J. L. 415, 72 A. 70 (1909).
294
Dennistoun v. Davis, 179 Minn. 373, 229 N. W. 353 (1930), and see
supra, p. 236 ff.
295
Pope v. Whitridge, IIO Md. 468, 73 A. 281 (1909).
296
In re Delaware River & A. R.R., 76 N. J. L. 163, 68 A. l 104 (1908).
288
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proxy holder's authority is revokeq. by the death of the grantor.297 It
is sometimes provided by statute that a duly executed proxy bearing .
a later date filed with the secretary of the corporation revokes all prior
proxies,298 that a termination of a proxy holder's authority by act of
the shareholder is ine:ffective until written notice of the termination has
been given to the secretary of the corporation,299 and that the presence
of the person executing the proxy suspends the authority of the proxy
holder. 30° Furtliermore, some states by statute wisely provide that the
proxy holder's authority is not revoked by the death or incapacity of
the grantor unless written notice of such death or incapacity is given to
the corporation.801
1 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 651 ( 1914); I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, §
120 (1933).
298
Cal. Civ. Code (1934), § 321; La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939), § II 12 (III).
299
Idaho Code (1932), § 29-133 (3); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939), § III2
(III); Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25 (IV); Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, .1938), § 8623-53 (6); 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), § 2852-504; Wash.
Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1940), § 3803-28 (4).
soo Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 321.
301
Cal. Civ. Code (1941), § 321; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7492-25
(VII); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8623-53(5); 15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1938), § 2852-504; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937), § 3079.
297

